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he cultural project of nationalism embraces modem technol-
ogy-the ability to broadcast at a distance the resonant symbols
of power and purpose, permitting governments to address
citizens remote from the center and detached from the state's administra-
tive representatives. The creed of shared burden and ambitions, the
exhortations of a charismatic leader, the iconography of flag and battle, the
claim of danger and challenge-the central symbols of nationalism-are
brought forward through technology.
But the new technology of the Internet allows a more whimsical
speculation for the utopians among us. If a liberal constitutional state
depends on shared commitment and a common political project, can this be
negotiated through the Internet even among individuals who live apart? If
there is telecommuting in our working lives, could there be telegovernment
in our political lives? If the requirement of democracy is the determination
of a general will, can't this be done by Cyber-balloting? Can a state be
virtual? Must it be located anywhere at all besides Cyberspace?
It may be feckless to discuss statehood in anything other than an
exhaustive account of how national movements have come to subsume
territorial space. But on the occasion of an annual meeting of international
Cyber-lawyers, the danger is worth disregarding, at least for a moment.
In the mid-1990s, Professor Tom Farer argued that geography was an
atavistic basis for organizing the international community.' Rather than
have the UnitedNations work through regional caucuses ofLatin American
* Professor of Law, Yale University Law School. Senior Fellow for
International Organizations and Law at the Council on Foreign Relations.
See Tom Farer, A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention, in ENFORCING
RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 316-47 (Lori
Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993).
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states, or African states, or Western European and other states, why not
organize a caucus based on common political principles? The example of
the British Commonwealth served the point, and in the late 1990s, one
might also note the emergence of a new group of "like-minded" states-a
self-styled caucus that has supported a ban on anti-personnel land mines2
and a permanent international criminal court,' also announcing a work
program on children in combat, small weapons trafficking,4 and other
matters.
But if geography does not matter for "regional" groups, why worry
about geography even for the state itself?. After all, various states and
entities have been noncontiguous. Examples of states with separated
territory include East and West Pakistan in 1948, the eighteenth century
claims of Connecticut in the Ohio Valley, and the current structure of
Republika Srpska in Bosnia.'
Why must a state be territorial at all? To be sure, most people think of
their communities as earth-bound. We are corporeal beings. Police, water,
fire protection and defense are terra firma functions. Until everything
becomes virtual, it is going to be difficult to have a completely virtual
government.
Yet a Cyber-state could contract for services through territorial
providers. Many local governments have already privatized municipal
services, arranging with private companies to supply garbage removal,
snow-plowing, even supplemental security services. What, after all, is the
comparative advantage of a public bureaucracy in service billing or
handling surge demand?
Scoffing at geography is not the inclination of most international
lawyers, of course. The prerequisites for international legal personality
were firmly settled in the twentieth century by the Montevideo
Convention.6 To gain recognition as a state, entities have needed a
2See Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 1507 (entered into force Mar. 1, 1999).
3 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N.
Doe. A/Conf.183/9*.
4 See Organization For Security and Cooperation in Europe: Seminar on the
Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons, Apr. 3-5, 2000, OSCE Press Release
(visited May 12, 2000) <http://www.osce.org/e/docs/presrel/2000-106-sg.htm>.
' See Republic of Srpska (visited May 12, 2000) <http://www.srpska.org/
srpska>.




population, effective governance (sustained by common allegiance and
habitual obedience), and the ability to conduct international relations.
Equally central, in the traditional account of the state, is the requirement of
a territory.7 The cultural existence of a people or ethnicity-a collective
sense of shared history and common fate-does not suffice for interna-
tional recognition unless a group can also claim a territory. In the Balkans,
the term "nationality," or "narodski," is reserved for people who have a
homeland, even if they are living abroad.
Common territory thrusts people into contact with each other.
Adjacency brings common needs, and may inspire the effort to form a
government and work jointly. Yet the link between territory and political
stability is hardly steadfast; the Balkans are proof that intermingled
populations do not necessarily act cooperatively. The link between territory
and politics can be pernicious, the incubus of conflict. If exclusive territory
is needed for an international voice or vote, then rival groups must fight for
territorial control-fueling secessionist movements and the bloody strife
of civil war. If recognition as a national entity can only be gained by facts
on the ground, then land will be fought over even if it is not otherwise a
productive economic asset. The moral hazard of linking land and voice is
only partly solved by the loose-jointed structures of confederation, since
the control of the confederation's international tongue is still at issue.
The positivist requirements of Montevideo have been supplemented in
this decade by a more ambitious European proposal for normative criteria
of legitimate state power. In 1992, confronting the dissolution of the former
Soviet Union and the incipient conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the
European Communitydecidedthat therecognition ofnewbreakaway states
should turn on their adoption of liberal political structures. The European
Community suggested four new conditions for statehood: the rule of law,
political democracy, civil liberties, and the guarantee of rights to ethnic
minorities.8 The attractiveness of this theory is not lessened by the
European Community's later disregard of the particular findings made by
its own arbitral tribunal, chaired by Robert Badinter, the former President
of the French Conseil d'Etat.9
'See id. at art. 1 ("The state as a person of international law should possess the
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c)
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.").
8 See Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of
New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union, Dec. 16, 1991 (European
Community), 31 I.L.M. 1485.
9 See Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on Ques-
tions Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Opinions 1-10, Jan. 4, 1992, 31
1999-2000]
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But even with the ethical litmus of a "Badinter screening," a futuristic
statesman in a Cyber-connected world might challenge one of the
Montevideo conditions for statehood-the requirement of a national
territory.
The brilliant comedy of British actor Peter Sellers, in the 1959 film
"The Mouse That Roared,"'" may give us a hint of a Cyber-future. In the
film based on Leonard Wibberley's novel," Sellers was cast as the self-
styled leader of an imaginary microstate, the Duchy of Grand Fenwick.
Armed with crossbows, the Duchy declares war on the United States,
hoping to qualify for post-war economic assistance. To their dismay, the
Duchy's archers fail in their quest for defeat, successfully invading New
York City.12
Peter Sellers' imaginary Duchy was about the size of three Pacific
island states admitted to the United Nations in 1999-the islands of
Kiribati, Nauru, and Tonga inthe South Pacific. 3 Grand Fenwick is closely
akin to the European microstates of Liechtenstein and Monaco, admitted
to the United Nations in 1990 and 1993 respectively. 4 Each of these
countries is proof that a state does not need much territory to vote in the
General Assembly.
But no territory at all? Is Grand Fenwick really comparable to Cyber-
states whose territory is only virtual? While the Internet's Cyber-nations
have been a motley lot so far, the idea of Cyber-politics may remain
attractive, and challenge our general account of nationalism and statehood.
One Cyber-country is the Republic of Lomar,5 established by a
California computer systems administrator, claiming 4100 citizens. 6
Lomar has cautiously organized as a non-profit foundation in the territorial
state of Delaware, but Lomar's motto is worthy of an Internet nation:
"Empowering our citizens and partner States through knowledge,
technology and development."' 7 Issuing passports and stamps, Lomar
I.L.M. 1488.
10 THE MOUSE THAT ROARED (Columbia-TriStar 1959).
" LEONARD WIBBERLEY, THE MOUSE THAT ROARED (1955).
12 See THE MOUSE THAT ROARED, supra note 10.
13 See UnitedNationsMemberStates (visited May 12,2000) <http://ww.un.org
Overview/unmember.html>.
14 See id.
" See The Republic ofLomar-Official Website (visited May 12, 2000) <http://
www.republic-of-lomar.org/>.
6 See The Republic of Lomar Information Center (visited May 12, 2000)
<http://www.republic-of-lomar.org/information/index.htm>.




argues that it can provide a nationality of last resort for worldwide citizens
opposed to autocratic regimes.
Another Cyber-country is the Kingdom of Talossa, 8 organized in 19 8 1,
boasting fifty citizens. In a broader humor, Talossa claims a mythic
connection to the Berbers of North Africa,'9 and a language that favors the
letter X and the umlaut. Its foreign policy is to recognize other micro-
nations and its leisure activity is politics, holding mock elections every
eight months.
A third, more roguish example, is the Dominion of Melchizedek. 0
It claims territory on an uninhabited island in the Pacific and (against
the dictates of international law) additional territory in Antarctica.2 It
has provoked other established sovereign states by offering the sale of
invalid passports and permitting unauthorized banking transactions. 2
Melchizedek's founder is not cut from the same cloth as Madison and
Washington: he was convicted of mail fraud and currency violations and
founded Melchizedek upon his release from jail.' Yet its symbols of
state power have been convincing enough to persuade at least one mem-
ber of the U.N. to invite Melchizedek to open an embassy in its capital
city.
24
In a post-Columbian world, there is no unclaimed land. Founding new
states has thus become a harder enterprise. Emigration has to be inward,
rather than outward, and a dissentient group of pilgrims faces the fact that
a claim to sovereignty over land is bound to conflict with an existing
territorial state. The purport of Web nations is that this should not
matter-a community can be organized in electronic space as easily as in
geographic space. If a group of people wish to be bound together in their
travails and choose to congregate electronically, why shouldn't the law
catch up?
"8 See The Ingdom of Talossa (visited May 9, 2000) <http://www.execpc.
com/-talossa/>.
"' See Talossa FAQ: What is Talossa? (visited May 9, 2000) <http://www.
talossa.com/RT-FAQ/tall.htm>.
20 See Government of the Dominion of Melchizedek (visited May 9, 2000)
<http://www.melchizedek.com/>.
2 See The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, art. 4(2), 12 U.S.T. 794 (entered into
force June 23, 1961).
' See Sascha Segan, Welcome to Lomar (visited May 12, 2000) <http:l
abcnews.com/sections/world/dailynews/microstates_991124.html>.
2 See id.




The full portfolio of Web nations is hard to catalog. A "micronation,"
says one Web site, is "a nation that, for whatever reason, has failed to
achieve recognition by other 'major' nations of the world." It may have
no territorial claim at all, or may claim to "co-occupy territory claimed by
[another] macronation." '26 Another Web master catalogs all "virtual
entities" by phonic affiliation (with surprising numbers of entities operating
in French, English or Italian). The virtual nations mix imagination and
historical immanence: "Par 'entit virtuelle' nous entendons toute entit6
16gendaire, fictive, imaginaire ou encore non territoriale, y compris celles
pouvant 6ventuellement rassembler un nombre important de citoyens dans
le cadre de structures dont la r6alit et la permanence ne sauraient 6tre
mises en doute."27
The need for the Badinter conditions, even in the imagination, is seen
in the Web catalog's uncritical inclusion of at least one racially invidious
enterprise." More respected ambitions may be seen in the Web site for the
"Government of Tibet in Exile. 29
The Web presence is not always pacific. At least one of the Cyber-
states is engaged in a terrestrial civil war. The Republic of Abkhazia was
an independent entity for a brief period in the twentieth century, claiming
territory in what is now the Republic of Georgia in the former Soviet
Union. Most Abkhaz were expelled to Turkey in the nineteenth century by
the czar of Russia. But the remaining 90,000 Abkhaz people claim the right
to independence, and have fought against Tbilisi since 1991 for that
purpose, destabilizing the regime of Georgian President Edward
Shevardnadze. There is a U.N. mediator in the region, as well as U.N.
military observers, but this has not succeeded in resolving the dispute30
The self-proclaimed Republic of Abkhazia is not recognized by any other
member of the U.N., but claims on the Web to have a "Permanent
' Sovereign Republic of Malveale: Micronations (visited May 11, 2000)
<http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHiI/3517/micro.html>.
26 Id.
2Microstates & Micronations List ofthe InstitutFranqais de Micropatrologie
(visited May 9, 2000) <http://www.geocities.com/Capito1Hill/5829/LIST.html>.
See id. (listing the micronation of "Aryan Nations").
29 The Government of Tibet in Exile (visited May 9, 2000) <http://www.tibet.
con!>.
3 See Ruth Wedgwood, The Promise of and Obstacles to Effective Peace-
keeping by the CIS: The Abkhaz-Georgian Conflict, in CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAw ISSUES: NEW FORMS, NEW APPLICATIONS 67 (T.M.C. Asser
Instituut, 1998); Ruth Wedgwood,A Conflict Worth Settling, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, July 24, 1997.
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Representative to the United Nations." Its Web presence has announced
"policy" statements, including at one point a veiled threat against Russia's
oil pipelines.3
The Web nations pose the constructivist puzzle of how nations gain
recognition in the international arena. Recognition is often a political act,
not simply a description of objective conditions. It is impolitic to recognize
a Web nation that claims territory belonging to an existing member of the
U.N. The territorial integrity of all U.N. member states is guaranteed by the
U.N. Charter.32 But what if the new nation is contented to be virtual? The
willingness to deal with a self-announced collection of people is, ulti-
mately, a political choice. As David Korem, Dominion of Melchizedek
founder and Web entrepreneur put it, "The more they talk about us, the
more they write about us, the more real we become in the eyes of the
world."33
The gap between self-consciousness and international recognition is
not, after all, unique to the Web. Since 1991, a terrestrial group called the
Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation ("UNPO") has operated
in the Hague and Geneva, and at U.N. conferences, claiming to represent
fifty-two ethnic "nation[s] or people[s]" that lack independent states or a
direct international voice and vote.34 Five UNPO members have achieved
independence during the decade-Armenia, Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, and
Palau.31 UNPO asks that members "advance their interests... through non-
violent means, including diplomacy, use of the United Nations and other
international procedures for the protection of human rights, developing
public opinion and other action oriented strategies, and exploring legal
options to defend their rights.136 The organization has questioned "the
exclusion of nations, peoples and minorities which do not constitute
independent states from access to international fora and organizations." '37
An inter-governmental organization such as the U.N. only seats the
31See generally The Republic ofAbkhazia (visited May 11,2000) <http://www.
abkhazia.org/home_def.html>.
32 See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
33 Segan, supra note 22 (quoting David Korem).
I See UNFOMembers (visitedMay 12,2000) <http://www.unpo.org/member/
#current>.
35 See id.
36 Editor's Preface, UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLES ORGANISATION:
YEARBOOK 1995, at xv (Mary Kate Simmons ed., 1996).
37 Michael van Walt van Praag, General Secretary, A BriefHistory of UNPO,
in UNREPRESENTED NATIONS AND PEOPLES ORGANISATION: YEARBOOK 1995
(Mary Kate Simmons ed., 1996).
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representatives of states, even if there is a new concern about the claims of
indigenous peoples and other dissentient minorities and nationalities.
UNPO membership is available to any unrepresented "Nation" or
"People."38 These categories might seem broad, and indeed are defined to
include any "group of human beings which possesses the will to be
identified... and to determine its common destiny as a nation or people."39
But then with a backward glance that may disappoint postmodemists,
membership is further limited to the groups that are "bound to a common
heritage which can be historical, racial, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious
or territorial."' 4
UNPO membership has not been sought by any newborn Cyber-
communities. The travails of ethnic minority communities in the real world
are a clear distinction. But a common heritage can develop over time,
among people who choose to affiliate. While UNPO members may prefer
territorial independence, an alternative way of meeting their concerns is to
assure international voice and weight even without territory.
Decoupling territory and personality can also claim paternity in the
suggestion of Professor Gidon Gottlieb of the University of Chicago some
years ago. Professor Gottlieb argued that secession might seem unneces-
sary if national groupings were permitted some of the marks of interna-
tional dignity currently enjoyed by states-such as the use of a flag or
international sports participation, and a direct voice in international
institutions. 41 The predicate of sovereignty, Gottlieb argued, should be
personal, not territorial.
Nationalism is a cultural project. The successful construction of
modem nation-states has often proceeded by enlisting people to meet a
common danger, by myth-making and social invention, even by diluting
cultural differences, reaching beyond politics to the most intimate account
that people hold of their origin and fate. Writers such as Benedict Anderson
have sketched how power and geography often do not coincide in a nation-
" See Covenant of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation, Feb.
11, 1991, title II, art. 5, available at The UNPO Covenant (visited May 11, 2000)
<http://www.unpo.org/maindocs/0710cove.htm>.
39 Id. at title II, art. 6. Compare ELIAS CANETrI, THE AGONY OF FLIES: NOTES
ANDNOTATIONS 192 (H.R. Broch de Rothermann trans., 1994): "DerKonsequente,
der fir jede Nation ist, auch fir solche die nur zwei Sprecher zihlen."/"The
consistent person who speaks out in favor of all nations, even though whose
language is spoken only by two people."
4 0 Id.
41 See GIDON GOTTLIEB, NATION AGAINST STATE 35-40 (1993).
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state-for territorial boundaries may extend beyond the limits of a
community's self-conception.4 2 The working loyalties and overhanging
identity of local communities and social groups are far more complicated
than the 188-space sovereignty system of Westphalia and the United
Nations. The real circumstances of warring ethnic groups, winner-take-all
governments, and unstable boundaries of colonial origin suggest that a
common geography is not always enough ground for political coherence.
In thinking about the audacious claims of Cyber-nations (those virtual
enterprises that lack a new found land), we may wonder at the failure of so
many terrestrial states-which have a capital, a flag on First Avenue, but
no common political enterprise.
42 See BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (2d ed. 1991).
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